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Abstract
Elementary sentences containing the quantificational determiner some seem to be ambigu-
ous between a ‘weak’ existential meaning ∃ and a ‘strengthened’ some but not all meaning
∃+. The strengthened meaning is commonly assumed to be the output of a general enrich-
ment mechanism, call it G (for ‘global’), that applies to the weak meaning of the sentence:
G(∃) = ∃+. The application of G has been shown to come with a processing cost (e.g., Bott
and Noveck 2004). We used a self-paced reading task together with offline comprehension
questions to investigate the interpretation of sentences containing some when embedded inside
a disjunction, a position that G cannot access. Our findings suggest (i) that the strengthened
meaning ∃+ is available in embedded positions, suggesting that a mechanism of local strength-
ening L must be available: L(∃) = ∃+, (ii) that local enrichment can be facilitated by global
pragmatic pressures (Chierchia et al. 2008, Mayr and Romoli 2014), (iii) that subjects can be
quickly trained to systematically prefer one of G or L to the other, (iv) that application of L,
like the application of G, comes with a processing cost. We highlight consequences of our
findings for debates about the characterization of enrichment mechanisms, focussing on the
relation between G and L.
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1 Introduction: Strengthening and processing
1.1 Global strengthening
Elementary sentences containing logical operators like some and or systematically generate
two readings, a ‘weak’ and a ‘strengthened’ reading:
(1) The letter is connected to some of its circles.
a. Weak meaning: false if the letter is connected to none of its circles; otherwise
true (= ∃)
b. Strengthened meaning: false if the letter is connected to none or all of its circles;
otherwise true (= ∃+)
(2) John ate pizza or apples.
a. Weak meaning: false if John ate neither pizza nor apples; true otherwise
b. Strengthened meaning: false if John ate neither pizza nor apples or if he ate both;
true otherwise
The ambiguities in (1) and (2) appear cross-linguistically, and are never lexicalized (Horn
1972). For these and other reasons (e.g., McCawley 1981, Simons 2000, Sauerland 2012)
the ambiguities are commonly explained by assuming that the lexical entries for or and some
encode weak meanings which get strengthened by a general mechanism (Grice 1967). To a first
approximation this mechanism can be thought of as a function that takes the utterance S and
an alternative sentence S′ and returns ¬S′. This negated alternative is the ‘scalar implicature’
of S, and the conjunction S ∧ ¬S′ is the ‘strengthened meaning’ of S, S+.
(3) The letter is connected to some of its circles.
a. Weak meaning: ∃
b. Alternative: The letter is connected to all of its circles (= ∀)
c. Scalar implicature: ¬∀
d. Strengthened meaning: ∃ ∧ ¬∀ (= ∃+)
There are debates about the characterization of alternatives and about the strengthening
mechanism itself. Most relevant to our discussion is the question whether the strengthening
function is a domain-general reasoning mechanism or a domain-specific operator realized in
the grammar.
On the domain-general view, ∃+ is what a rational listener would conclude on the assump-
tion that the speaker who uttered ∃ was obeying principles of rational cooperative social inter-
action that we assume are familiar (e.g., Grice 1967, Horn 1972, Gamut 1991, Spector 2005,
2006, Schulz and van Rooij 2006, van Rooij and Schulz 2004, Sauerland 2004, Russell 2006,
Franke 2011). However, it has long been noted that domain-general principles must be sup-
plemented with restrictions on scalar alternatives if the empirically attested implicatures are to
be derived, and the restrictions do not themselves follow from domain-general considerations
(e.g., Kroch 1972, Gazdar 1979, von Fintel and Heim 1999, Fox 2007a, Katzir 2007). With-
out such restrictions, Gricean reasoning does not not yield ∃+ but rather ignorance inferences
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entailing that the speaker is ignorant about the stronger alternative ∀.1 To overcome this limi-
tation to ignorance inferences, all systems need to set grammatical restrictions on alternatives
(‘Horn scales’).
Fox (2007a, 2013) suggests an alternative perspective that would allow domain-general
reasoning to remain ‘pure’ (free of grammatical restrictions) by re-assigning grammatical stip-
ulations to the grammar itself. Specifically, he suggests that a covert operator exh with a
meaning like only is available in the grammar and that, when appended to ∃, the new sen-
tence exh(∃) would have the same meaning as (4); without exh, pragmatic reasoning delivers
ignorance inferences about the stronger alternative ∀ (cf. footnote 1):2
(4) The letter is connected to only some of its circles.
Literal Meaning: the letter is connected to some but not all of its circles (= ∃+)
For the moment we need not take sides on the debate. To proceed we need to make the
following assumptions, which so far as we can tell are common to both sides:
(5) Strengthening assumptions
a. Scalar items have a weak meaning (e.g., [[some]]= ∃).
b. There is a strengthening function, G, which strengthens the weak meaning of the
asserted sentence (e.g., G(∃) = ∃+). Crucially, we assume at this point that G
only has access to the meaning of the entire sentence (it is ‘global’); information
about the meanings of subconstituents is lost at the root.3
c. Strengthening is an alternative-sensitive computation: G takes as input a sentence
S, and a set of alternative sentences/propositions ALT (S), and conjoins with
[[S]] the negation of some propositions in ALT (S). (We provide a more specific
characterization in later parts of the text.)
1We assume that the reasons for this are familiar. To briefly remind the reader, the main problem is that if al-
ternatives are determined by relevance (answers to a question-under-discussion, e.g., Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984,
Lewis 1988, Roberts 1996), then when ∀ is relevant, ¬∀ will also be relevant because relevance in the intended sense
is closed under negation – relevance is about whether a proposition is true. The alternatives ∀ and ¬∀ are ‘symmetric’:
each of them can be negated while maintaining consistency with ∃, but not at the same time. At best, one may negate
that the speaker believes that any of them is true, which would yield that the speaker is ignorant about whether ∀ is
true, but not that she holds the belief that it is false.
One may argue that this is not much of a problem if we take into account that ¬∀ is not stronger than ∃, and hence
might not play a role at all. But note that (a) non-stronger alternatives cannot easily be taken out of the picture and
(b) the reasoning also applies if we replace ¬∀ with ∃ ∧ ¬∀, which is plainly stronger than the initial sentence and
ought to be an alternative too if relevance is closed under conjunction.
Horn-scales (Horn 1972) are used to break the symmetry by excluding ¬∀ as an alternative. See especially the
discussion of the ‘symmetry problem’ in Fox (2007a), Katzir (2007), Fox (2013), Fox and Katzir (2011).
2See also Chierchia (2004, 2006), Fox (2007a), Chierchia et al. (2008), Magri (2009b), Gajewski and Sharvit
(2012), Fox (2013). Gazdar (1979) and Chemla (2009) also develop domain-specific systems, but these systems might
be thought of as modules dedicated to conversational reasoning belonging to neither grammar nor central systems.
3Neo-Gricean proposals would identify G with the grammatically-restricted pragmatic reasoning laid out earlier,
which naturally applies to whole sentences since it is a general purpose reasoning system that is supposed to process
whole messages that may be received. The grammatical theory would identify G with matrix application of exh,
which may in other occasions apply to smaller pieces of linguistic material, as we will shortly discuss. What is
important is that under either approach G as we define it here does not have access to information about the meanings
of sub-constituents.
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d. Strengthening is optional, which we take to mean that application of G is optional
(though see Magri 2009b, 2011).
1.2 Processing complexity
A persistent finding is that interpretation of a sentence containing some (henceforth simply
some) with its strengthened meaning ∃+ takes longer than when it is interpreted with its weak
meaning ∃ (e.g., Noveck and Posada 2003, Bott and Noveck 2004, Breheny et al. 2006, Huang
and Snedeker 2009, Bott et al. 2012, Chemla and Bott 2014; see Noveck and Reboul 2008,
Katsos and Cummins 2010, Chemla and Singh 2014a,b for reviews). We will assume, then,
that application of G to assertions of ∃ comes with some cost.
Our goal in this paper is to examine the processing of some when it occurs embedded
in non-asserted positions, such as when some is embedded under disjunction: the letter is
connected to some or none of its circles. Specifically, we will examine whether enrichments
of some can be detected in such positions and, if so, whether they are costly like their global
counterparts. Given the limitation of G to full sentences, it cannot apply inside the disjunction
(neither disjunct is asserted). Nevertheless, there is evidence from offline judgments that local
enrichments are available, suggesting that a mechanism of local strengthening L must exist.
1.3 Local strengthening
Our discussion has so far been limited to sentences containing a single logical operator. Call
such sentences ‘elementary sentences.’4 What happens when scalar items are embedded under
additional operators? Consider (6), which we assume has the logical form ‘every letter x, x is
connected to some of its circles’ (we ignore here the likely quantifier movement out of object
position):
(6) Every letter is connected to some of its circles.
By extending the general procedure in (3) from elementary sentences to sentences of arbi-
trary complexity, the constituent ‘x is connected to some of its circles’ would be converted
to ‘x is connected to all of its circles’, generating the alternative (that gets pronounced as)
every letter is connected to all of its circles. G would negate this alternative, producing the
strengthened meaning that every letter is connected to some of its circles and that not every
letter is connected to all of its circles. This does not, however, yield another reading that (6)
has been argued to have, namely, that each letter is connected to only some of its circles (e.g.,
Chierchia 2004). To derive this embedded enrichment one might be tempted to posit an addi-
tional strengthening mechanism, L, which would apply to the embedded occurrence of some
4Note that elementary sentences might be syntactically complex, containing multiple sentential constituents. For
example, a disjunction p∨q contains the two disjuncts p and q, and a sentence containing a single quantificational noun
phrase like The letter is connected to some circles plausibly has the logical form ‘some circles x, the letter is connected
to x’, and thus contains at least one sentential sub-constituent (‘the letter is connected to x’). On the ‘formulas’ view
of the structure of quantificational noun phrases (Heim 1997), the LF for this sentence would contain even further
propositional constituents (though see Kennedy 2014). We hope we can abstract away from these syntactic issues and
focus solely on operator complexity in what follows. We thank a reviewer for helpful comments.
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to produce the desired embedded ∃+ meaning: every letter x,L(x is connected to some of its
circles).
It has been argued that the apparent embedded strengthening might actually be derivable
through purely global reasoning. Specifically, it has been argued that the desired reading can
be derived with G alone by (i) expanding the set of alternatives to also include some letter is
connected to all of its circles, and (ii) allowing G to negate not only stronger alternatives but
also those that are merely non-weaker than the assertion (Chemla 2009, Chemla and Spec-
tor 2011, Chemla and Singh 2014a,b). Thus, sentences like (6) do not provide evidence for
L; as noted earlier, the theory of strengthening needs to resolve many fine-grained choice-
points about alternatives and the nature of strengthening, and (i) and (ii) are consistent with
current knowledge (though see Fox 2007a, Note 35 for concerns with (i); we return to this in
section 3.2).
A more direct motivation for L comes from the behaviour of some under disjunction. Con-
sider the innocuous-looking sentence in (7):
(7) The letter is connected to some or all of its circles.
Without application of L at the first disjunct the sentence would actually violate ‘Hurford’s
Constraint’ (Hurford 1974), which bans disjunctions when one of the disjuncts entails the other
(Fox 2006, Spector 2006, Fox 2007b, Chierchia et al. 2008; see also Gazdar 1979 and Simons
2000, and see Chemla 2009, Singh 2012, Meyer 2013, Katzir and Singh 2014 for attempts to
derive the constraint from more general principles):5
(8) a. #John is an American or a New Yorker.
b. #John ate an apple or a fruit.
There are two things to note. First, the disjunctions in (8) are extremely odd. Second, (7) has
no hint of oddness. If Hurford’s Constraint is right, then (7) should pattern like (8), which it
clearly does not.
Fox (2006), Spector (2006) and Chierchia et al. (2008) use this contrast to argue that a
mechanism of local strengthening must be available at the first disjunct of (7). Without L the
contrast between (7) and (8) remains unexplained, but the availability of L would allow (7)
to be rescued by breaking the entailment between the disjuncts: ‘the letter is connected to
only some or all of its circles’ would schematically be equivalent to ‘∃+ ∨ ∀’, and there is no
entailment relation between ∃+ and ∀. One may argue that L is allowed only in such special
cases, when it comes to the rescue to satisfy an otherwise deviant sentence or it gives rise
to special intonational markedness (e.g., Geurts 2009). However, as far we know there is no
discussion of how this contrast could be explained using only global reasoning mechanisms.
5Chemla (2009) and Singh (2012) propose to derive the constraint from a contradiction between the inference that
the speaker believes the assertion, B(p∨q), and the implicature that the speaker does not believe either disjunct (recall
that for a Hurford disjunction p ∨ q is equivalent to one of its disjuncts). This does not extend to embeddings of
Hurford Disjunctions: John isn’t a New Yorker or an American is odd, but because ¬(p ∨ q) entails ¬p ∧ ¬q, there
is no misleading ignorance implicature that can be generated. An alternative view relies on redundancy: a sentence is
odd if one of its constituents could be deleted with no loss of information (Katzir and Singh 2014, Meyer 2013). This
statement captures the oddness of matrix and embedded Hurford disjunctions, but it needs to be modified for reasons
we don’t discuss here. For our purposes, the important observation is that there is a contrast between (7) and (8) which
can be described with Hurford’s Constraint whatever the explanation behind the constraint.
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Let us therefore assume for the moment that a local strengthening mechanism L exists. We
want to find out whether embedded enrichments – applications of L – come with processing
cost, like applications of G do (cf. section 1.2). In the classic Bott and Noveck (2004) paradigm,
one compares the RTs of a sentence under its strengthened and unstrengthened readings, where
the readings are determined by participants’ truth-value judgments in contexts in which the
different readings give different truth-values. Unfortunately, this method cannot be applied in
sentences like (7) because the truth-conditions of the locally strengthened and unstrengthened
sentences are the same: ∃ ∨ ∀ ⇐⇒ ∃+ ∨ ∀ ⇐⇒ ∃. The argument for L in the case of (7) is
based on patterns of felicity judgments, rather than truth-value judgments.
We would like to remain as methodologically conservative as possible, and thus would like
to find cases of local strengthening that change global truth-conditions — in order to inde-
pendently assess and manipulate parsing decisions. We would also like to preserve the key
property of the Hurford paradigm, which requires that local strengthening takes place in order
to satisfy a global pragmatic pressure (satisfaction of Hurford’s Constraint) — this will allow
us to derive fine-grained processing predictions at various points in time.6 We saw that the
purported embedded strengthening in (6) does yield a new reading, but as we noted earlier
this datum might not provide evidence for L. Furthermore, there are debates about how robust
this reading is (e.g., Chierchia 2004, Sauerland 2004, Geurts and Pouscoulous 2009, Chemla
and Spector 2011, Clifton and Dube 2010, Geurts and van Tiel 2013). Chierchia et al. (2008)
produce sentences like (9) as examples of local strengthening that both obviate Hurford’s Con-
straint and change global truth-conditions (note that, because it violates Hurford’s Constraint,
the weak meaning in (9-a) is actually unavailable in normal discourse):
(9) Of these ten problems, Jack solved the first and the second problem or he solved all of
them.
a. Weak meaning: Jack solved the first two problems, and possibly more (e.g., true
if he solved only the first three problems)
b. Locally strengthened meaning: Jack either solved only the first two problems, or
he solved all of them (e.g., false if he solved only the first three problems)
In (7), strengthening of the first disjunct did not change global truth-conditions because, in a
sense, the semantic effect of this strengthening is ‘cancelled’ by the second disjunct (the second
disjunct reintroduces the proposition that is negated at the first disjunct). More precisely, the
second disjunct all is the only alternative to some, and for all p and q the proposition (p∧¬q)∨q
is equivalent to p∨q which, in a Hurford configuration, is equivalent to p (when q ⊂ p).7 Thus,
there is no change in global truth-conditions. In (9), however, there are many more alternatives
that can be negated that are intermediate in strength between the first and second disjunct,
such as Jack solved the first three problems. This difference allows local strengthening to
have global truth-conditional consequences: strengthening of the first disjunct negates these
6There is evidence that L’s ability to rescue sentences from Hurford’s Constraint is subject to incrementally eval-
uated constraints that block L from applying when the weaker disjunct is sentence-final. For example, in response to
the question who came to the party?, A’s answer is appropriate but B’s is not: A: (John or Mary) or both vs B: # Both
John and Mary or (John or Mary) (Singh 2008a,b, Fox and Spector 2008, 2015). This qualification is not relevant to
our study, since the weaker disjunct is always initial.
7For ease of exposition, we will not carefully distinguish between sentences and propositions. However, when
propositions are intended, ∧ here should be understood as intersection, ¬ as set-complement, and ∨ as union.
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alternatives, and the second disjunct cannot cancel these inferences. More abstractly, let p, q, r
be propositions such that p ⊂ r ⊂ q. Then the proposition (p ∧ ¬r ∧ ¬q) ∨ q is not in general
equivalent to p ∨ q. In a Hurford configuration, the former is equivalent to (p ∧ ¬r) ∨ q while
the latter is equivalent to p. Thus, local strengthening in such configurations – called ‘distant
entailing disjuncts’ in Fox and Spector (2008) – can lead to global strengthening as well.
Example (9) thus satisfies our design considerations so far, but no study has investigated
the processing complexity of enrichments in such configurations and, in fact, very little infor-
mation exists about the processing profiles about the specific scalar enrichments involved in
here to begin with. There is however evidence that different scalar items may pattern differ-
ently in terms of derivation rates (e.g., Reinhart 2006, Chemla 2013, van Tiel et al. in press),
and therefore possibly on processing grounds, too (and one can find direct evidence of process-
ing differences between some and numerals, e.g., in Huang and Snedeker 2009, Marty et al.
2013; see Chemla and Singh 2014b for a summary). We would thus like to stick with some, if
possible, so that interpretation of any comparative findings might stand on firmer footing.
Our own experiment, discussed in detail in the next section, uses disjunctions like the
following:
(10) The letter is connected to some or none of its circles.
On its literal meaning, this sentence provides no information: ∃ ∨ ¬∃ is a tautology.8
Pragmatic pressures to be informative in discourse (e.g., Grice 1967, Stalnaker 1978) might
thus encourage subjects to apply L to the first disjunct, because such a reading would now
convey the information that the letter is not connected to all of its circles: ∃+ ∨ ¬∃ ⇐⇒ ¬∀.
Disjunctions like (10) will be our critical items: they require local strengthening to satisfy
a global pragmatic constraint, local strengthening produces a new meaning, and we use scalar
items (some) whose processing profiles in matrix sentences are well-described. Our experi-
ment, discussed in detail in the next section, first trained participants to apply one of L (the
‘local’ group) or G (the ‘global’ group) to items like (6),9 and then presented them with critical
items like (10). Assuming the training to be effective, the local group should tend to insert
8We considered the possibility that (10) could be a so-called L-analytic tautology in the sense of Gajewski (2004);
that is, that it has the truth value ‘true’ independent of the non-logical lexical items involved. Concretely, all sentences
of the form “The A is V to some or none of its B” are true, no matter what lexical items replace A, V and B.
Such configurations are supposed to give rise to deviance judgments close to plain ungrammaticality judgments (e.g.,
von Fintel 1993, Gajewski 2004; see also Fox 2000, Fox and Hackl 2006, Abrusán 2014). However, as pointed by a
reviewer, it is more plausible to assume that the form is “The A is V to some of its B1 or none of its B2” and even
though the two Bs are realized in the same way at the surface, there is room to obtain a non-tautologous sentence
with this structure, e.g., “The letter is connected to some of its circles or none of its squares.” As a further argument
against an L-analyticity approach to this sentence the reviewer rightly points out that plain L-analytic tautologies such
as “Someone but John came to the party” are less acceptable than sentences of the form “The letter is connected
to none, some but not all, or all of its circles”. The difference in acceptability seems to be not merely a matter of
degree, but also of kind; as noted earlier, L-analytic sentences are ungrammatical, while the tautologous sentence is
perfectly grammatical but is an unhelpful speech act. Furthermore, there may be degrees of pragmatic acceptability; for
example, Katzir and Singh (2014) note that Hurford sentences are less acceptable than tautologies. Note furthermore
that the uninformative sentence ‘none or some but not all or all’ is similar in structure to our example of interest, but
its tautologous aspect cannot be saved by potential local exhaustification.
9Danny Fox (p.c.), an anonymous reviewer, and Bernhard Schwarz point out that it is very important to consider
whether our training and target sentences can receive their seemingly local readings through global strengthening (just
like we showed that the ¬∀ strengthened meaning of (6) can) and to carefully evaluate the consequences of such a
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L at the first disjunct immediately. We expected this to have two detectable outcomes. First,
there should be more ¬∀ readings in the local group, because their initial analysis directly pro-
duces this reading whereas the global group generates it only after reanalysis. Second, both
groups are expected to hit processing delays while reading the sentence, but the costs should
be encountered at different regions: the local group should find difficulty early because they
strengthen the first disjunct right away, and the global group should find difficulty later because
they have to re-analyze at the second disjunct (to avoid tautology).
2 Experiment
2.1 Design and predictions
In our experiment, we examined the reading times for items such as (10). To avoid tautology,
participants must interpret the ‘some’ of ‘some or none’ to mean ‘some but not all’. That is, we
expected these materials to elicit the application of L. If L exists and the pragmatic pressure to
be informative is real, participants should reject ‘some or none’ when ‘all’ is true; if not, they
should accept ‘some or none’ when ‘all’ is true.
We also wished to investigate the time-course of this operation. L could operate either at
the point at which ‘some’ is first encountered, or subsequently, as a consequence of reanalysis.
We assume thatL, like G, is optional in the positions in which it is licensed, and we investigated
whether subjects could be trained to apply one of L or G in their initial analysis of the sentence.
To separate these possibilities, we proposed to compare the reading times for participants
under two distinct training conditions intended to favor one or the other of these interpretation
strategies. We biased one group of participants (the ‘Local’ group) to perform apparently local
enrichments to embedded instances of ‘some’ under ‘every’ (e.g., every letter is connected
to some of its circles) and another group (the ‘Global’ group) to perform only the global en-
richments of these sentences. We then examined their self-paced reading times on disjunctive
sentences like ‘Letter D is connected to some or none of its circles.’ The Global group should
not perform immediate local enrichments. Consequently, they would need to reanalyse the
sentences upon encountering ‘or none’ in order to avoid tautology. By contrast, the Local
group may perform immediate local enrichments and thus may not need to go through a re-
analysis. We therefore predicted that reading times for the Local group would be faster than
for the Global group in the quantifier’s spillover region ‘of its circles.’ We also expected to
find that, if L incurs a cost, Local participants would be slower than Global participants in the
quantifier region itself (‘some or none’).
2.2 Procedure
The experiment comprised 100 trials and was implemented using Ibex Farm.10 In each trial,
a sentence was presented one word at a time. Participants were instructed to press the space
possibility for the interpretation of our results. We will return to this point in section 3.2; we put off discussion until
then because, as we will see, a G-based account does not make sense of our experimental results, and in fact there are
reasons to doubt that the set of alternatives that would be needed are available at all.
10Participants in the local group actually saw 101 trials; one non-important item appeared twice in the list of items
by mistake.
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bar to proceed to the next word. After each sentence, a diagram was displayed, and partici-
pants were instructed to indicate whether the sentence was true or false as a description of the
diagram (by pressing T for ‘true’ or F for ‘false’). The reading times for each word and the
responses for each prompt were recorded and analysed.
Participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and were paid for their participa-
tion. The two versions of the experiment were fielded on separate days in December 2013. 122
participants were recruited for the Global training condition and 104 for the Local condition.
Both versions of the experiment contained two sets of items, the first set was presented with
feedback and the second set without feedback. The items were the same across the two training
conditions; only the nature of the feedback varied for a couple of items, as we describe below.
2.2.1 Items and conditions
The first set of items (with feedback) contained 48 items presented in a random order. They
were of the form ‘Q1 letter is connected to Q2 of its circles’, where Q1 is either ‘every’ or ‘no’
and Q2 is either ‘some’, ‘all’ or ‘any’. Feedback was provided on the participant’s response,
indicating whether or not the participant judged the sentence correctly.
The second set of items (without feedback) contained 52 items presented in a random
order (with the exception that the first two were fixed non-critical items). 28 of these items
were of the same form as those in the first part of the experiment. 24 were of the form ‘X is
connected to Q3 of its circles’, where ‘X’ denotes a letter (A, B, C, D, E or F) and ‘Q3’ denotes
a quantifier, ‘some’, ‘none’, ‘all’, or ‘some or none’. The critical items in the second part of
the experiment involved sentences of the form ‘X is connected to some of its circles’ and ‘X
is connected to some or none of its circles’. Each of these sentences was presented six times
to each participant, twice followed by a picture in which the relevant letter was connected to
all of its circles, twice followed by a picture in which it was connected to some but not all of
its circles, and twice followed by a picture in which it was connected to none of its circles.
Example pictures for the letter D are shown in Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c, respectively. Control
items of the form ‘X is connected to all of its circles’ and ‘X is connected to none of its circles’
were presented in the same way (one word at a time) and associated with similar displays.
(a) Example with the target let-
ter D connected to all of its cir-
cles.
(b) Example with the target let-
ter D connected to some but not
all of its circles.
(c) Example with the target let-
ter D connected to none of its
circles.
Figure 1: Representative examples of displays, as associated for instance with the target sentence
‘D is connected to some or none of its circles.’
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2.2.2 Training and feedback procedure
The Local and Global training conditions differed only with respect to the feedback that was
given for the sentence ‘Every letter is connected to some of its circles’ in the first part of the
experiment, as summarised in Table 1. In both training conditions, this sentence was described
as ‘False’ for displays such as Figure 1a, on the grounds that every letter is in fact connected
to all of its circles. In the Global condition, this sentence was described as ‘True’ for displays
such as Figure 1b. However, in the Local condition, it was described as ‘False’, on the basis
that some of the letters are in fact connected to all of their circles (i.e., it is not true that every
letter is connected to some but not all of its circles). Each critical sentence/picture combination
occurred six times. In both training conditions, the assessment of the remaining 36 items in
the first phase of the experiment did not depend on any enrichment.
Description of display Feedback for:
Global Group Local Group
Every letter is connected to all
of its circles (Fig. 1a).
It was false: in fact, every let-
ter was connected to *all* of
its circles.
It was false: in fact, every let-
ter was connected to *all* of
its circles.
The letters in the first row are
connected to all of their cir-
cles; those in the second row to
some but not all of their circles
(Fig. 1b).
It was true. It was false: in fact, the let-
ters in the first row were con-
nected to *all* of their cir-
cles.
Table 1: Feedback for critical items in Global and Local training conditions for the sentence ‘Every
letter is connected to some of its circles.’
2.3 Results
The whole set of results and an R script that reproduces the following analyses can be found at
http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/2M5Nzk4Z/.
In the global training condition, we obtained 87 participants after excluding results from 4
who did not declare English as their native language, 6 for repeated Mechanical Turk IDs, and
25 for achieving less than 90% success on unambiguous items.
In the local training condition, we obtained 78 participants after excluding results from 4
participants who did not declare English as their native language, 2 participants for repeated
Mechanical Turk IDs, and 20 participants for achieving less than 90% success on unambiguous
items.
2.3.1 Off-line truth-value judgments
To test the effects of training and the pressure to avoid tautologies on participants’ truth-value
judgments, we compared participants’ responses to the critical items in the second phase of the
experiment (‘X is connected to some (or none) of its circles’). In particular, we examined the
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situations in which the relevant letter was connected to all of its circles, as these are the only
occasions on which the response depends upon the presence or absence of the enrichment of
‘some’.
The sentences with ‘some or none’ were accepted for 20.7% of these items by Global
participants, and 7.1% by Local participants. Furthermore, 26/87 Global participants (30%)
gave at least one acceptance, but only 8/78 Local participants (10%) did so, representing a
significant difference (χ2(1) = 8.5, p = .0035). The fact that a large majority of participants in
both conditions rejected the ‘some or none’ items suggests that the pressure against tautology
was generally effective in motivating the application of L. In addition, the training regime
made a significant difference, given that the Local participants were more likely to strengthen
embedded instances of ‘some’ than the Global participants. This is as expected if L is available
and preferences between G and L have been manipulated.11
2.3.2 Reading times
We removed from consideration any data in which any of the response times for the words
in the region of interest (‘some (or none) of its circles’) exceeded 1000ms, which we took to
reflect possible interruptions or loss of concentration. This excluded 9.5% of the data, leading
us to analyse 477 trials from global participants and 419 trials from local participants.
As the diagrams are presented after the sentences, they can have no effect on the reading
times, so we can pool data from all display conditions. Considering sentences of the form ‘X
is connected to some or none of its circles’, the mean reading times (and SDs) are shown in
Table 2 and presented in Figure 2a.
some or none of its circles
Global 317 (111) 315 (108) 346 (128) 358 (97) 350 (93) 390 (90)
Local 351 (137) 321 (111) 384 (147) 360 (107) 345 (86) 397 (109)
Table 2: Means (and SDs) of participants’ average reading times per word (in ms) for the region
‘some or none of its circles’.
To explore the effect of training on the processing of the quantifiers, we fit the reading
times of the two regions (the Quantifier region ‘some or none’ and the Spillover region ‘of
its circles’) with mixed models using the lme4 package (Bates et al. 2014a,b) for R (R Core
Team 2015). We modeled fixed effects of region, training and their interaction. We modeled
a random effect of participant, including an intercept and a random slope for region. We also
modeled a random effect of item with a maximal random structure with intercept and slopes for
region, training and their interaction (see Barr et al. 2013). Since the items were all identical,
11 Turning to elementary sentences, we found sentences with ‘some’ were accepted as a true description of an ‘all’
display for 16.7% of the items by Global participants and 5.8% by Local participants; 21% of Global (18/87) and 10%
of Local (8/78) participants gave at least one acceptance in this condition. This difference is surprising, given that both
local and global participants should obtain the same some but not all meaning, albeit possibly by different means. It
could be the result of a ‘no’ bias in the local group. Note however that it is not significant (χ2(1) = 2.6, p = .10), and
that a ‘no’ bias cannot entirely explain the previous difference for the target condition because the two distributions,
for target and elementary sentences, are different from each other (χ2(7) = 141, p < 10−15).
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Figure 2: Reading times per regions for the critical items for (a) all trials, (b) first trials only. Error
bars represent standard errors to the mean.
we encoded their identity as their position within the whole list of items of the experiment. We
obtained an estimate of 79ms for the critical interaction factor, which is significantly different
from zero according to a comparison with a minimally different model that simply lacks this
interaction term χ2(1) = 5.5, p = .019. We note that the RTs violate the normality assumption
(Shapiro-Wilk normality test: W = .97, p < .10−15). We thus also report the results of a
similar model based on log RTs (although they also violate the normality assumption, Shapiro-
Wilk normality test: W = .99, p < 10−10), which support qualitatively similar conclusions
(estimate of a 6.7% effect on the RT, χ2(1) = 3.9, p = .049).12
We sought to explore per participant analyses only, because of the low number of items (6),
because the items were repeated identically for a given participant, and to abstract away from
the possible influence of one critical item to the next. First we ran a model as above but without
per item random effects and obtained similar results (β = 77ms, χ2(1) = 5.8, p = .016, with
log RTs β = 6.4%, χ2(1) = 3.9, p = .047).
Strikingly, we obtain the same results by focussing the analyses on the first valid occurrence
of the relevant condition for each participant (β = 183ms, χ2(1) = 8.9, p = .0028, with
log RTs β = 16%, χ2(1) = 7.7, p = .0056). The relevant figures are presented in Table 3 and
Figure 2b.13
12We add however that the Q-Q plot of both RTs and log RTs ‘look’ reasonable, neither being clearly better or worse
than the other. An anonymous reviewer prompted us to work on these issues more carefully; this and virtually all other
statistical reports have been improved thanks to this reviewer’s input.
13For these latest two models we had to restrict the structure of the random effect to an intercept, for not having
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some or none of its circles
Global 325 (136) 316 (119) 400 (205) 462 (200) 410 (159) 425 (136)
Local 374 (153) 318 (117) 484 (250) 423 (163) 403 (144) 423 (146)
Table 3: Means (and SDs) of reading times per word (in ms) for each participant’s first item of the
kind in the region ‘some or none of its circles’.
We interpret these results as indicating that, relative to the Global condition, participants in
the Local condition were slower to read the Quantifier region and faster to read the Spillover
region. This effect was, if anything, stronger on the first occurrence of the relevant condition,
when pollution by other aspects of the experimental situation are less likely to have occurred.
2.4 Discussion
Our offline results, based on truth-value judgments, provide evidence that embedded strength-
ening is robustly available, and can be facilitated by the need to satisfy global pragmatic pres-
sures (recall that in both conditions the overwhelming majority of participants rejected some or
none when ‘all’ is true). Furthermore, because the number of such rejections was significantly
greater in the Local condition than in the Global condition, our training was effective, vali-
dating a posteriori the possibility of obtaining the local reading of our training every...some...
sentence by local means.
Our online results, based on incrementally evaluated RTs, provide evidence that embedded
strengthening is costly. Participants in the Local condition were slower than Global participants
in the initial region of the sentence, which we interpret as indicating that local strengthening
is costly (recall that our offline results show that our training was effective). The initial cost
paid by local strengtheners paid dividends in later parts of the sentence: upon encountering
none, they face no pragmatic penalty but participants who do not locally strengthen must re-
analyse in order to avoid a tautologous reading. Our offline results showed that the pressure
to be informative is real, and our online results show that the required reanalysis costs the
Global participants with increased RTs sentence-finally. The observed mid-sentence reversal
in relative RTs between Local and Global participants is a common finding in psycholinguistic
studies: a decision made at one stage of evaluation will have consequences at later stages of
evaluation, leading to well-known garden-path effects that sometimes can be recovered from
with reanalysis (e.g., Frazier and Rayner 1982, van Gompel and Pickering 2001 and much
other work). Our materials aimed to construct strengthening-based garden-path effects: those
participants who don’t initially strengthen save on a processing cost only to later discover that
they made the wrong decision, and bear a penalty at that point.
3 General discussion
We found evidence for the application of L under disjunction, and we found that application of
L is costly. This result thus extends to embedded positions the common finding that application
sufficiently many data points to do more, given that we restrict attention to one item only.
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of G is costly. Perhaps the most natural interpretation of this extension is that L = G; that is,
there is a single strengthening mechanism which comes with a processing cost in whatever
position it applies. This interpretation straightforwardly follows from the grammatical theory,
under which a grammatical application of exh is responsible for strengthening. Because exh
can apply in global and embedded positions, we would expect it to be costly wherever it shows
up. As far as we can tell, this is the simplest explanation of the current data. In the remainder
of this section we would like to explore possible explanations of these results without appeal
to exh.
3.1 Local enrichments as distorted or misguided applications of G
At first blush, it’s not clear how an embedded strengthening could apply in some or none with G
alone, nor is it clear from what assumptions it would follow that such a strengthening should be
costly in the way that G is. One possibility is that occurrences of L are just perverted versions
of G, which mimic G opportunistically, say to rescue the sentence from deviance. However,
to understand the benefits of such an approach one would have to specify what the constraints
are on such a perversion of G into L, and how the output of such an L is computed (if not by
manipulating assumptions about the speaker’s beliefs, as for G).
Another possibility is that participants might strengthen using G together with the default
assumption that the continuations of the sentence are all elementary.14 Thus, upon reading
some a participant might guess that the sentence will be elementary, some X Y (for someX and
Y ), and then compute a global enrichment over such continuations: within some reasonable
limits for the values of X and Y , the sentence some X Y will be entailed by all X Y. This could
justify the incremental computation of a strengthened meaning for some, but crucially there is
no appeal to L. This line of reasoning is not complete, however. Note that upon encountering
or, participants reasoning in this way would have to incorporate their (mistaken) computation
with the final semantic decoding of the sentence in some way that is left undefined. Most
plausibly, they would have to plainly revise their analysis: the connective provides evidence
that the sentence is complex, which in turn would ‘cancel’ the strengthened meaning of some
(G does not have access to sub-constituents; cf. footnote 3). The prediction, then, is that a
cost earlier in the sentence (corresponding to enrichment) would lead to an additional cost
after processing or (corresponding to cancellation and revised computation). But this is the
opposite of what we find.
3.2 Seemingly local effects via the manipulation of alternative sets
In this section we entertain (and rule out) the possibility that the seemingly local readings can
be derived by global means, provided the right set of alternatives can be given to them. This
discussion is therefore highly sensitive to the theory of alternatives one chooses to follow.
It is useful to recall from section 1.3 that, in cases like every...some, an apparent embedded
strengthening can be derived with global reasoning alone together with certain assumptions
about alternatives. Thus, what we have been referring to as ‘local’ vs. ‘global’ training might
14The default assumption could be motivated by a parsing strategy under which participants analyze the sentence
so as to find the least complex parse consistent with the overt string (cf. Miller and Chomsky 1963 and much work
since).
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instead have been training participants to select one set of alternatives instead of another. Re-
call that the ‘local’ reading ‘every letter is connected to some but not all of its circles’ can
be derived with G if alternatives may be generated with multiple scalar replacements, and in
particular if the replacements lead to an alternative that does not entail the asserted sentence.
This assumption allows some letter is connected to all of its circles to be an alternative, whose
negation – in conjunction with the assertion – is equivalent to the local reading. Thus, our Lo-
cal participants may have been trained to generate all non-weaker alternatives using multiple
replacements, whereas Global participants might have been trained to use a more restricted set
of alternatives that prevents some...all from being an alternative.15
Fox (2007a) and (Magri 2009a, Part I) propose a natural constraint on alternatives that
provides the intended restriction. This constraint, call it F&M’s constraint, proposes that alter-
natives are generated step-wise through a sequence of replacements such that each replacement
operation starting from an alternative A must not lead to an alternative A′ that is entailed by
the starting point A. Going from every...some to some...all requires two replacements: every
in subject position must be replaced by some and some in object position must be replaced by
all. However, there is no way to make these replacements in sequence while satisfying F&M’s
constraint (assuming existential import of quantifiers): the replacement of every with some
in subject position will create a conflict with the constraint, no matter when it occurs in the
sequence of replacements. If we start by replacing the object quantifier, the computation fails
at the second step because some...all is weaker than every...all, and the computation fails if we
instead start with the subject replacement, because some...some is weaker than every...some.
Thus, the only alternative that is available under this constraint is every...all, and thus only the
‘global’ reading can be generated.
Suppose, then, that there is no local strengthening mechanism L, and suppose that our ‘Lo-
cal’ participants differed from our ‘Global’ participants in the choice of whether they followed
F&M’s constraint in generating the alternatives used by G: the Local group ignored F&M’s
constraint while the Global group obeyed it. Under this assumption, assuming that alterna-
tives are derived by replacing nodes with other lexical items or with subconstituents (Katzir
2007), we obtain distinct sets of alternatives for our target sentence some or none too. The
alternatives for the Local group are CL = {∃,¬∃,∀,∀ ∨ ¬∃,¬∀,∃ ∧ ¬∀} and the alternatives
for the Global group are CG = {∃,¬∃,∀,∀ ∨ ¬∃} = CL \ {¬∀,∃ ∧ ¬∀}. The difference
between CG and CL is that F&M’s constraint prevents ¬∀ and ∃ ∧ ¬∀ from being generated.
If G is identified with the standard innocent exclusion algorithm for strengthening (Sauerland
2004, Fox 2007a), which we assume to be familiar, G is vacuous when applied to our target
sentence (some or none) with CL as alternatives, but when applied with CG as alternatives it
outputs ¬∀.16 Thus, under these assumptions about alternatives, which crucially are motivated
by independent considerations, it is possible to get the desired ¬∀ strengthened meaning out
of ∃ ∨ ¬∃ using G alone.17
15Crucially, given that strengthening is known to occur in non-monotonic environments (see e.g., Chemla and
Spector 2011 for experimental data), a limitation to only stronger alternatives will not suffice.
16Note that each alternative in CL has its negation as an alternative, which means each alternative has a symmetric
alternative (cf. note 1) and hence none is ‘innocently excludable’ (Fox 2007a). On the other hand, the maximal
consistent exclusions ofCG are {∃,∀} and {∀,¬∃,∀∨¬∃}; their intersection is ∀, and thus ∀ is innocently excludable.
17We thank an anonymous reviewer, Danny Fox and Bernhard Schwarz for urging us to investigate this possibility
more carefully, and for pointing out an error in an earlier version.
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Although we have a purely global mechanism for avoiding tautology in some or none, this
mechanism makes strange predictions about the offline data. Specifically, the global group is
trained to go with CG, and thus to avoid tautology. The obvious prediction, then, is that we
should find more rejections of some or none when ‘all’ is true for participants in the Global
group than for participants in the Local group, who, at best, need to revise their original as-
sumption that the relevant set of alternative is CL. But this prediction is the opposite of what
we find.
Let us explain the situation in more abstract terms. F&M’s constraint filters alternatives.
Quite often, more alternatives lead to more inferences, simply because there are more candi-
dates for being excludable. This is the situation in the training case (every...some...), where
the potential some...every... alternative is innocently excludable, provided that it is a legitimate
alternative. But in the target case (some or none) the opposite actually happens: fewer alter-
natives lead to more inferences. This is so because, in this particular case, the biggest subset
of alternatives is full of symmetry (i.e., conflict), which prevents alternatives from being inno-
cently excludable (for discussion of possibly similar cases, see e.g., Fox and Hackl 2006, Fox
2007b, Singh 2008a,b, Katzir 2013, Trinh and Haida 2015). Somewhat counterintuitively then,
this is a case where a smaller subset of alternatives gives rise to a bigger set of innocently ex-
cludable alternatives. Hence F&M’s constraint puts opposite pressure on the training and target
cases. What we find however is a parallelism between them, whereby stronger inferences in
training lead to more enrichments in targets, too.
In sum, even without considering the necessary assumptions about processing concerning
G that could explain the reading time differences between our two groups, the possibility of a
global derivation of the non-tautologous reading of our target sentence is hard to reconcile with
the current set of data. Instead, we find evidence in favor of a common mechanism that leads
to strengthening of the training sentences and avoids the tautologous reading for the target
sentences. Local L strengthening may therefore be at play not only for the target sentences but
also for the training, controversial every...some... sentences.18
3.3 Conclusion
We presented a judgment and reading time study of sentences containing the scalar item some
in embedded positions. The resulting data are hard to reconcile with approaches of scalar
implicatures based on global G mechanisms only, but can be explained if we assume: (i) that
local and global mechanisms are identical (L = G), and (ii) that application of this mechanism
is costly, wherever it appears.
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